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1.	Introduction	
Previous	research	has	shown	strong	indications	that	the	use	of	Voting	Advice	Applications	(VAAs)	has	
an	impact	on	both	political	participation	and	on	electoral	behaviour.	Several	studies	(e.g.,	Fivaz	and	
Nadig	2010;	Garzia	et	al.	2014;	Gemenis	and	Rosema	2014;	Germann	and	Gemenis	2014)	established	
that	the	use	of	VAAs	motivates	to	go	to	the	polls	and	 leads	to	higher	voter	turnouts.	Although	the	
mobilising	 effect	 is	 not	 huge	 (typically	 1-4%)	 it	 is	 often	 accompanied	 by	 an	 especially	 strong	
mobilisation	among	young	voters	and	voters	with	below	average	political	knowledge.	
Regarding	the	impact	of	VAAs	on	the	electoral	decision-making	process	previous	research	presents	a	
similar	picture.	Based	on	a	large	number	of	studies	using	data	from	multiple	countries	and	elections	
it	seems	well-established	that	VAAs	affect	voters	using	such	applications	 in	their	electoral	decision-
making.	The	extent	is	somewhat	unclear	–	or	at	least	differs	largely	between	countries	(e.g.,	Ladner	
et	al.	2010;	Ladner	et	al.	2012;	Ladner	et	al.	2012;	Pianzola	2014a;	Vassil	2012;	Walgrave	et	al.	2008).	
Whereas	 in	 Finland	 only	 3%	 of	 the	 users	 have	 been	 influenced	 in	 their	 electoral	 decision	 by	 the	
advice	they	received	from	a	VAA,	in	other	countries	the	numbers	are	higher:	6%	in	Germany,	10-15%	
in	 the	 Netherlands,	 and	 almost	 70%	 in	 Switzerland	 (Ladner	 and	 Fivaz	 2012).	 Besides	 different	
methodological	 approaches	 between	 the	 studies,	 the	 different	 electoral	 systems	 may	 also	 be	
responsible	 for	 large	 parts	 of	 the	 observed	 cross-country	 variance.	 In	 Switzerland	 voters	 can	 vote	
both	for	parties	and	directly	for	individual	candidates	from	different	parties	(by	splitting	their	votes	
between	 parties).	 Thus,	 being	 influenced	 by	 a	 VAA	 does	 not	mean	 necessarily	 that	 a	 Swiss	 voter	
switched	 completely	 from	 one	 party	 to	 another,	 it	 might	 well	 be	 that	 he	 or	 she	 only	 switched	
partially	or	distributes	the	votes	over	more	parties.	
In	 a	 nutshell,	 previous	 research	 on	 VAA	 impact	 has	 shown	 that	 VAAs	 influence	 their	 users	 in	 the	
following	 ways:	 they	 foster	 voter	 turnout	 and	 also	 have	 effects	 on	 party	 choice.	 It	 is,	 however,	
somewhat	 surprising	 that	 most	 studies	 –	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 a	 few	 theoretical	 contributions	
(Anderson	 and	 Fossen	 2014;	 Fossen	 and	Anderson	 2014;	 Fossen	 and	 van	den	Brink	 2015)	 –	 solely	
focus	 on	 the	 impact	 on	 the	 electoral	 behaviour	 of	 voters,	 but	 do	 not	 explicitly	 address	 questions	
related	 to	 the	 potential	 impact	 on	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 representational	 processes	 as	 a	 whole.	
Questions	like	whether	the	use	of	VAAs	leads	to	better	electoral	decisions	(i.e.,	closer	to	the	personal	
preferences)	 which	 would	 contribute	 to	 the	 improvement	 of	 political	 representation	 have	 been	
neglected	by	VAA	research.	
This	 paper	 intends	 to	 tackle	 this	 research	 gap	 by	 addressing	 the	 following	 research	 question:	Do	
VAAs	improve	the	quality	of	the	representational	process?	The	present	state	of	our	paper	represents	
only	 a	 tentative	 first	 draft.	 Our	 analysis	 applies	 a	 simplifying	 but	 straightforward	 approach.	 We	
analyse	 the	 congruence	 of	 political	 parties	 with	 their	 voters	 on	 a	 number	 of	 policy	 issues.	 This	
congruence	 serves	as	our	depended	variable,	whereas	 the	use	of	 a	VAA	 is	our	 central	 explanatory	
variable.	Regarding	the	operating	mode	of	VAAs	and	the	above	mentioned	previous	research	results	
we	expect	that	voters	using	a	VAA	exhibit	on	average	a	stronger	positional	congruence	with	the	party	
they	voted	for	compared	to	voters	who	did	not	use	VAAs	at	all.	 If	we	find	evidence	supporting	this	
hypothesis	 this	would	mean	 that	VAAs	not	 only	 assist	 voters	with	 their	 individual	decision-making	
but	also	contribute	to	the	overall	quality	of	the	representational	process	by	minimising	the	political	
distance	between	citizens	and	elected	political	elites.	
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Before	we	 present	 our	 analysis,	 findings	 and	 conclusions	 the	 following	 section	 briefly	 outlines	 the	
theoretical	background	of	our	paper.	
	
2.	Theoretical	background:	VAAs	and	the	quality	of	representative	democracies	
Modern	democracies	can	be	identified	by	a	number	of	institutional	features	such	as	general	suffrage,	
civil	and	political	rights	like	the	freedom	of	speech	or	freedom	of	the	press,	the	rule	of	law,	free	and	
competitive	 elections	 with	 multiple	 parties	 and,	 crucially,	 by	 an	 elaborated	 system	 of	 political	
representation	 safeguarding	 that	 parliament	 and	 government	 implement	 policies	 according	 to	 the	
will	of	the	people.	
Even	 after	 almost	 50	 years	 Pitkin	 (1967:	 209)	 offers	 still	 one	 of	 the	 catchiest	 and	most	 influential	
definition	of	political	representation:	
“Representation	 here	 means	 acting	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 represented,	 in	 a	 manner	 responsive	 to	
them.	The	representative	must	act	independently;	his	action	must	involve	discretion	and	judgement;	
he	must	be	the	one	who	acts.”	
Two	aspects	of	Pitkin’s	definition	stand	out:	First,	it	identifies	responsiveness	as	the	central	element	
of	 political	 representation.	 And	 second,	 it	 emphasises	 that	 the	 representative	 has	 to	 represent	
actively.	A	 representative	 is	 not	 representing	 specific	 groups	of	 voters	because	he	or	 she	 is	 of	 the	
same	 age,	 gender	 or	 has	 the	 same	 social	 background.	 He	 or	 she	 is	 only	 representing	 a	 group	 of	
citizens	by	acting	actively	in	the	interest	of	this	group	(e.g.,	by	voting	in	accordance	with	the	interests	
of	the	represented	voters	in	parliamentary	votes).	
Pitkin’s	 concept	 of	 substantial	 representation	 –	 standing	 for	 a	 representation	 of	 political	 issues,	
interests,	 preferences	 or	 political	 values	 in	 contrast	 to	 a	 descriptive	 representation	 by	 socio-
demographic	characteristics	as	age,	gender,	educational	or	income	level	–	was	transferred	by	Powell	
(2004)	 into	his	well-known	concept	of	 the	“chain	of	responsiveness”.	Based	on	this	concept	Powell	
outlines	an	ideal	process	of	democratic	responsiveness.	Democratic	responsiveness	is	reached	when	
the	representational	system	 induces	parliaments	and	governments	 to	 form	and	 implement	policies	
consistent	to	the	citizens’	wishes.	The	better	this	process	works	the	better	the	quality	of	the	specific	
democratic	system	(Powell	2004:	91).		
According	to	Powell’s	concept	the	transformation	of	citizens’	wishes	into	public	policies	occurs	over	
four	 linked	 steps:	 1.	 Citizens’	 preferences;	 2.	 Citizens‘	 voting	 behaviour;	 3.	 Selecting	 policy	makers	
(election	outcomes	/	government	formation);	4.	Outcome	/	implemented	public	policies.	
These	four	steps	are	linked	by	the	citizens’	process	of	electoral	decision-making	and	voting	(linkage	1	
Þ	2),	 the	aggregation	and	 transformation	of	 these	votes	 into	 seats	 in	parliament	and	government	
according	 to	 the	 regulations	 of	 the	 electoral	 system	 and	 the	 process	 of	 government	 formation	
(linkage	2	Þ	3),	and	finally	the	process	of	policy	making	between	elections	(linkage	3	Þ	4).	A	good	
matching	 between	 the	 citizen’s	 preferences	 and	 the	 implemented	 public	 policies	 alone	 does	 not	
necessarily	 indicate	 a	 proper	 democratic	 responsiveness.	 In	 a	 democracy	 a	 high-quality	
responsiveness	cannot	depend	on	good	luck,	advantageous	circumstances	or	solely	the	good	will	of	
policy	makers.	It	rather	requires	institutional	arrangements	that	bear	incentives	for	policy	makers	to	
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anticipate	and	realise	citizens’	preferences.	Furthermore,	incentives	for	elected	officials	to	keep	their	
electoral	pledges	and	hold	them	accountable	for	their	actions	in	parliament	and	government	after	an	
election	are	needed.	Only	if	all	these	institutions	and	procedures	are	in	place	and	properly	working,	
the	system	will	produce	systematically	democratic	responsiveness	(Powell	2004).	
VAAs	fit	quite	well	 into	the	theoretical	frameworks	provided	by	Pitkin	(1967)	and	Powell	(2004).	To	
guarantee	a	properly	working	 system	of	democratic	 representation	and	 responsiveness	 the	quality	
and	 the	 amount	 of	 available	 information	 is	 key.	Without	 political	 transparency	 and	 availability	 of	
reliable	 and	 comprehensive	 information	 on	 candidates	 and	 parties	 and	 their	 political	 positions	 as	
well	 as	 information	 about	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 elected	 officials	 during	 the	 legislative	 period	 an	
effective	monitoring	and	sanctioning	of	 incumbents	and	an	educated	electoral	decision-making	are	
not	possible	(Lupia	2003;	Müller	and	Meyer	2010).	Services	and	data	provided	by	VAAs	support	the	
proper	functioning	of	democratic	responsiveness	in	two	ways.	First,	they	facilitate	what	Kiewiet	and	
McCubbins	(1991)	call	the	ex	ante	control	(screening	of	candidates)	and	second,	the	ex	post	control	
(monitoring	of	elected	officials).	
The	present	paper	focuses	solely	on	the	former	(ex	ante	control).	The	latter	(ex	post	control)	 is	not	
less	important,	but	has	already	been	addressed	by	a	number	of	recent	publications	which	established	
the	potential	of	VAA	data	 in	combination	with	parliamentary	voting	records	 in	order	 to	strengthen	
democratic	control	of	MPs	(Fivaz	and	Schwarz	2007;	Fivaz	et	al.	2014;	Schädel	et	al.	2016;	Schwarz	et	
al.	2010).	
With	regard	to	the	ex	ante	control	–	the	selection	of	candidates	by	voters	in	the	run-up	of	an	election	
–	VAAs	provide	voters	with	unprecedented	possibilities	to	screen	and	select	the	candidates	according	
to	their	own	political	preferences	(Lau	and	Redlawsk	2006:	262).	This	 is	 the	point	where	our	paper	
steps	 in.	 If	 it	 is	 true	 that	 VAAs	 improve	 the	 level	 of	 information	 dramatically	 and	with	 regards	 to	
previous	VAA	research,	which	found	clear	evidence	that	VAAs	are	taken	seriously	and	have	an	impact	
on	 their	 users’	 electoral	 decision	 (see	 Section	 1),	 it	 is	 to	 expect	 that	 voters	 using	 a	 VAA	 exhibit	 a	
higher	 policy	 congruence	 with	 the	 candidates	 or	 parties	 they	 voted	 for,	 compared	 to	 voters	 who	
have	not	used	a	VAA.	
	
3.	Data	
According	 to	 our	 research	 question	 we	 intend	 to	 measure	 the	 impact	 of	 VAAs	 on	 the	 quality	 of	
representational	processes	by	using	the	congruence	of	political	positions	between	voters	(including	
VAA	 users	 and	 non-users)	 and	 the	 political	 parties	 they	 have	 voted	 for.	 We	 therefore	 need	
comparable	 data	 on	 the	 political	 preferences	 both	 of	 the	 political	 parties	 and	 of	 the	 voters.	 Our	
analysis	relies	on	two	surveys	conducted	around	the	2015	federal	elections	in	Switzerland.	
The	 first	 survey	 was	 conducted	 by	 the	 Swiss	 VAA	 smartvote	 (www.smartvote.ch)	 among	 all	
candidates	of	 the	2015	elections	and	provides	 the	positions	of	 the	political	parties.	With	 regard	 to	
the	 electoral	 system,	 which	 allows	 not	 only	 to	 vote	 for	 parties	 but	 also	 directly	 for	 specific	
candidates,	any	meaningful	operative	design	of	VAAs	in	Switzerland	is	candidate-centred	(in	contrast	
to	 VAAs	 in	most	 other	 countries	 providing	 their	 services	 on	 party	 level).	 The	 smartvote	 candidate	
survey	contained	75	questions	on	political	 issues.	The	survey	 started	 in	 June	2015	and	ended	with	
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the	 election	 day	 in	October	 2015.	 The	 vast	majority	 of	 candidates	 answered	 the	 questionnaire	 by	
mid-September.	All	 candidates	 running	 for	office	were	offered	participation	 in	 the	 survey.	Overall,	
there	were	 3,873	 candidates	 out	 of	which	 3,267	 or	 84.4%	 answered	 the	 smartvote	 questionnaire.	
Swiss	 elections	 are	 characterised	 by	 the	 large	 number	 of	 political	 parties	 competing	 for	 seats	 in	
parliament.	Many	parties	are	very	small	with	vote	shares	below	1%	and	also	running	only	in	one	or	
two	of	the	26	electoral	districts.	Therefore,	we	restrict	our	analysis	to	the	seven	main	parties	running	
a	nationwide	campaign	and	reaching	a	vote	share	of	at	least	4%.	Response	rates	among	these	seven	
main	parties	range	from	80.8%	to	95.9%	and	are	far	higher	than	usual	scientific	candidate	surveys.	
Regarding	this	extremely	high	response	rate	the	data	quality	is	very	close	to	a	full	population	sample	
which	 is	why	we	abstain	 from	applying	additional	weights	 to	compensate	 for	non-respondents	 (for	
details	 on	 the	 response	 rates	 see	 Appendix	 1).	 The	 positions	 of	 the	 seven	 political	 parties	 are	
calculated	based	on	the	answers	of	the	candidates	from	each	party.	
The	second	survey	we	rely	on	was	conducted	by	the	Swiss	Electoral	Studies	(Selects;	www.selects.ch)	
as	 a	 post-electoral	 survey	 among	 voters	 of	 the	 2015	 elections.	 For	 the	 first	 time	 the	 Selects	
questionnaire	contained	not	only	the	question	whether	a	voter	had	used	smartvote	as	 information	
source	before	the	election	but	also	a	battery	of	nine	 issue	questions	which	was	retrieved	from	the	
smartvote	candidate	questionnaire.	Additionally,	the	voters	had	been	asked	about	the	political	party	
they	voted	for	in	the	2015	elections.	This	allows	for	a	direct	comparison	of	the	political	positions	of	
parties	and	their	voters,	bypassing	the	methodological	challenges	which	would	have	occurred	if	we	
had	used	VAA	voter	data.1	
We	apply	several	 restrictions	 to	 the	Selects	data	set.	First,	we	only	 include	voters	 (the	sample	also	
contains	non-voters)	and	second,	we	include	only	voters	who	have	answered	all	nine	issue	questions.	
As	 further	 restriction,	 as	 already	mentioned,	 the	 analysis	 comprises	 the	 voters	 of	 the	 seven	main	
parties	 only.	 At	 the	 end	 our	 data	 sample	 contains	 3,333	 voters	 –	 among	 these	 582	 have	 been	
smartvote	users.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 candidate	data	we	apply	weights	 to	 the	 voter	data	 in	order	 to	
compensate	for	specific	biases.	Selects	offers	several	pre-defined	weights	of	which	we	apply	two:	the	
so-called	design	weight	to	compensate	for	biases	coming	from	the	data	collection	process,	and	the	
party	choice	weight	to	compensate	for	the	different	response	rates	among	the	specific	party	voters	
(for	details	see	Lutz	2016).	
A	key	element	in	our	analysis	is	the	distinction	between	all	voters	and	the	sub-sample	of	smartvote-
using	 voters.	 Previous	 research	 shows	 that	 VAA	 users	 usually	 differ	 from	 non-users	 in	 several	
respects:	 In	 general,	 women	 are	 under-represented	 and	 young	 voters,	 voters	 with	 a	 higher	
educational	and	income	level	are	over-represented.	Moreover,	voters	with	a	higher	political	interest	
and	knowledge	are	more	frequent	to	use	VAAs	(see	Ladner	2012;	Marschall	2014).	We	find	the	same	
pattern	 in	our	data,	albeit	with	significantly	smaller	differences	between	smartvote	users	and	non-
users	 than	 reported	 in	 previous	 studies	 (e.g.,	 Ladner	 et	 al.	 2010).	 Appendix	 2	 contains	 a	 detailed	
comparison	 of	 the	 two	 sub-groups	 with	 regards	 to	 both	 socio-demographic	 and	 political	
characteristics	like	political	interest,	knowledge	or	the	left-right	self-placement.	Graph	1	below	shows	
the	 differences	 between	 smartvote	 users	 and	 non-users	 regarding	 party	 choice.	 We	 observe	 the	
																																								 																				
1	Pianzola	(2014b)	shows	in	detail	the	pitfalls	of	using	VAA	voter	data	(e.g.,	self-selection	processes,	lack	of	
representativeness)	and	provides	also	one	possible	approach	to	treat	these	shortcomings	in	the	data	by	
applying	sophisticated	statistical	procedures.	
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expected	 bias	 that	 voters	 of	 the	 largest	 party	 –	 the	 SVP	 (right-conservative)	 –	 are	 clearly	 under-
represented,	while	voters	of	the	rather	small	and	new	GLP	(centre-left)	are	clearly	over-represented	
among	smartvote	users.	These	distortions	in	the	data	are	not	directly	compensated	for	(e.g.,	with	an	
additional	weight	or	other	statistical	measures).	To	meet	possible	concerns	 in	this	direction	we	use	
categorised	left-right	positions	of	the	voters	as	covariates	in	our	regression	models.	
Graph	1:	Party	choice	by	voters,	smartvote-users,	and	non-smartvote	users	(in	%)	
	
Source:	Source:	Selects	2015;	post-electoral	voter	survey;	applied	weights:	survey	design	weight	and	party	
choice	weight;	N	=	3,394.	
Notes:	CVP	=	Christian	Democrats	(centre);	FDP	=	Liberals	(centre-right);	SVP	=	Swiss	People’s	Party	
(conservative/right);	SP	=	Social	Democrats	(left);	GPS	=	Greens	(left);	GLP	=	Green-Liberals	(centre-left);	BDP	=	
Conservative	Democratic	Party	(centre).	
	
4.	Analyses:	parties,	voters	and	VAA	users	compared	
Both	 the	Selects	voter	 survey	2015	and	 the	smartvote	candidate	survey	2015	contained	nine	 issue	
questions	 in	 identical	 form.	 Thus	 the	 combination	 of	 the	 two	 datasets	 allows	 to	 conduct	 a	 direct	
voter-party	comparison	based	on	the	following	nine	policy	issues:2	
1. Do	you	support	a	raise	in	the	retirement	age	for	both	women	and	men	(e.g.	to	67)?	
2. Do	you	approve	that	the	federal	government	provides	financial	support	for	child	care	outside	
the	family?	
3. Should	the	naturalisation	process	for	third-generation	foreigners	be	simplified?	
																																								 																				
2	Questions	1-8	contained	the	four	answer	options:	„Yes“,	„Rather	yes“,	„Rather	no“	and	„No“,	whereas	
question	9	offered	five	answer	questions:	„Considerably	more“,	„More“,	„The	same	amount“,	„Less“	and	
„Considerably	less“.	
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4. Do	you	think	Switzerland	should	accept	an	increased	number	of	refugees	directly	from	crisis	
regions	for	which	the	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Refugees	(UNHCR)	needs	host	
countries	(what	is	called	quota	refugees)?	
5. Should	the	banking	secret	within	Switzerland	be	abolished	towards	Swiss	tax	authorities?	
6. A	popular	initiative	demands	that	nuclear	energy	be	completely	abandoned	by	2029.	Are	you	
in	favour	of	this?	
7. In	relation	to	the	redevelopment	of	the	Gotthard	road	tunnel,	Parliament	resolved	upon	the	
construction	of	a	second	tunnel	tube.	Are	you	in	favour	of	this?	
8. Resolutions	 made	 by	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (ECHR)	 are	 binding	 for	
Switzerland.	Do	you	think	that	this	is	justified?	
9. Social	services	budget:	Should	Switzerland	spend	considerably	more,	more,	the	same	
amount,	less	or	considerably	less?	
Using	the	(recoded)	answers	to	the	nine	policy	issues,	we	calculated	two	measures	for	the	positional	
difference	 between	 voters	 and	 the	 party	 they	 voted	 for.	 The	 first	 measure	 is	 based	 on	
Multidimensional	 Scaling	 (MDS;	 also	 known	 as	 principal	 coordinates	 analysis3)	 which	 provides	 a	
political	 space	 with	 two	 main	 dimensions.	 Whereupon,	 we	 are	 mainly	 interested	 in	 the	 first	
dimension	 coordinates	which	 represents	an	approximation	of	 the	dominant	 left-right	dimension	 in	
Swiss	politics	(Benoit	and	Laver	2006;	Hug	and	Schulz	2007).	The	range	of	the	calculated	coordinates	
lies	between	 -125.8	and	165.4.	A	party’s	position	on	 this	 left-right	axis	 is	defined	as	 the	arithmetic	
mean	of	 the	MDS	coordinates	of	 the	party’s	 candidates.	 The	positional	difference	on	 the	 left-right	
axis	is	the	absolute	difference	between	the	party	coordinate	(mean	of	candidates'	coordinates)	and	
the	 coordinate	 of	 the	 individual	 voter	 of	 that	 party.	 Figure	 2	 shows	 the	 histogram	 with	 the	
distribution	in	the	first	dependent	variable.	The	histogram	shows	the	expected	skewed	picture:	the	
number	of	 cases	decreases	with	 increasing	distance	of	 the	positional	distance	between	voters	and	
the	party	they	elected.	
	 	
																																								 																				
3	Based	on	the	Euclidean	distance	matrix	of	the	answers	of	candidates	and	voters	to	the	nine	policy	issues,	MDS	
generates	a	set	of	coordinates	such	that	the	distances	derived	from	these	coordinates	approximate	as	well	as	
possible	the	original	distance	(see	Cox	and	Cox	2001).	To	do	so,	we	used	the	basic	“cmdscale”	function	in	R.	
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Figure	2:	Distribution	in	the	dependent	variable	“Positional	difference	on	left-right	scale	(MDS)”	
	
	
The	second	measure	is	a	direct	comparison	of	the	answers	to	each	of	the	nine	policy	issues	between	
the	voter	and	the	party	he	or	she	voted	for.	In	a	first	step	we	calculated	for	each	question	and	party	
the	median	 answer	 (“party	 answer”).	 Then	 for	 each	 of	 the	 nine	 questions	 the	 absolute	 difference	
between	 the	 voter	 position	 and	 the	 party	 answer	 was	 calculated	 and	 finally	 totalized	 (which	
produces	an	index	of	issue-based	difference	ranging	from	0	to	900).	The	histogram	of	the	distribution	
in	 the	 second	 dependent	 variable	 (Figure	 3)	 shows	 a	 somewhat	 less	 skewed	 picture	 compared	 to	
Figure	2,	but	we	still	observe	the	decreasing	pattern	with	increasing	positional	difference.	
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Figure	3:	Distribution	in	the	dependent	variable	“Positional	difference	over	9	policy	issues”	
	
In	this	paper	we	are	addressing	the	question,	whether	voters	using	a	VAA	vote	for	parties	which	are	
positioned	closer	to	their	political	preferences	than	voters	not	using	a	VAA.	We	ran	a	couple	of	linear	
regression	 models	 on	 the	 two	 dependent	 variables	 measuring	 the	 voter-party	 distance.	 In	 these	
models	we	integrated	the	following	control	variables:	
• Political	 interest:	 The	 respondents	were	 asked	 about	 their	 general	 interest	 in	 politics.	 The	
values	range	from	1	(not	at	all	interested)	to	4	(highly	interested).	We	expect	that	politically	
interested	 people	 are	 better	 informed	 about	 the	 shape	 of	 the	 political	 space	 and	 the	
positions	 of	 the	 parties	 therein.	 Thus	 the	 higher	 the	 political	 interest	 the	 smaller	 the	
expected	positional	distance	to	the	elected	party.	
• Information	 sources:	 The	 Selects	 survey	 contains	 a	 set	 of	 binary	 questions	 asking	 about	
specific	 information	 sources	 voters	 used	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 elections	 in	 order	 to	 get	
informed	about	the	candidates	and	parties.	The	five	 items	 included	party	advertising,	party	
events,	broadcasting	programmes,	web/social	media	and,	as	a	specific	category,	 the	use	of	
smartvote.	From	these	five	options	we	constructed	an	“information	source	 intensity”	 index	
which	ranges	from	0	(no	information	source	used)	to	5	(all	named	sources	used).	We	expect	
that	the	more	information	sources	people	use	the	better	informed	they	are	about	the	shape	
of	 the	 political	 space	 and	 the	 positions	 of	 the	 parties	 therein.	 Thus	 the	 higher	 the	
information	 source	 intensity	 the	 smaller	 the	 expected	 positional	 distance	 to	 the	 elected	
party.	
• Use	of	smartvote:	The	crucial	variable	to	answer	the	research	question	is	the	binary	question	
if	 the	 voter	 has	 used	 smartvote	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 elections.	 We	 hypothesise	 that	
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smartvote	 users	 are	 better	 informed	 about	 party	 positions	 and	 that	 they	 show	 a	 smaller	
positional	distance	to	the	party	they	voted	for.	
• District	 size:	 In	 the	 2015	 elections,	 the	 number	 of	 seats	 in	 the	 electoral	 districts	 (Swiss	
cantons)	 varied	 between	 1	 and	 35.	 Although	 a	 PR	 voting	 system	 is	 applied	 throughout,	 in	
small	districts	 the	PR	system	approximates	 the	effects	of	majority	voting	systems	 (e.g.,	 the	
number	of	running	candidates/parties	is	limited,	as	well	as	the	number	of	candidates	with	a	
real	 chance	 to	 get	 elected)	 (Cox	 1990,	 1997;	 Carey	 and	 Shugart	 1995).	 Because	 of	 the	
restricted	party	supply,	we	expect	larger	positional	distances	in	smaller	districts.	
• Left-right	 position:	 In	 order	 to	 analyse	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 voter's	 left-right	 position	 on	 the	
positional	 congruence	 we	 use	 either	 the	 voters'	 MDS	 coordinate	 on	 the	 first	 dimension	
calculated	from	the	nine	policy	issues	(see	above)	or	the	self-placement	of	the	voter	on	a	11-
point	scale.	Both	variables	are	recoded	in	three	categories	of	equal	range	(left,	centre,	right)	
which	 allows	 to	 single	 out	 the	 effect	 for	 each	 of	 the	 three	 groups	 (reference	 category	 =	
centre).		
Additionally,	 the	 models	 include	 three	 socio-demographic	 control	 variables:	 Gender	 (1=male,	
2=female),	age	(in	years)	and	language	(reference	category	=	German-speaking	voters).	
Table	1	depicts	the	results	of	all	four	linear	regression	models.	Models	1	and	2	share	the	dependent	
variable	according	to	MDS	coordinates,	models	3	and	4	use	the	totalised	positional	distance	over	the	
nine	policy	issues.	In	all	four	models,	the	left-right	position	of	the	voters	exhibits	the	largest	effects	
on	positional	congruence:	Both	left-	and	right-wing	voters	show	a	lower	distance	to	the	positions	of	
the	 elected	 party	 than	 voters	 who	 are	 positioned	 (or	 position	 themselves)	 in	 the	 centre	 of	 the	
political	space.	
Throughout	 all	 four	 model	 estimations	 the	 use	 of	 the	 smartvote	 VAA	 has	 a	 significantly	 negative	
effect	at	 least	at	10%	level	on	positional	difference.4	This	corroborates	our	central	expectation	that	
voting	 decisions	 of	 people	 who	 use	 VAAs	 do	 have	 a	 closer	 match	 with	 their	 personal	 political	
preferences.	
Another	 significant	 variable	 is	 political	 interest	 which	 leads	 as	 expected	 to	 a	 smaller	 positional	
distance	between	a	 voter	 and	 the	elected	party.	 Finally,	 in	 three	models	we	 find	also	 a	 significant	
impact	of	 the	gender	variable	with	 female	voters	exhibiting	 smaller	positional	distances.	 Since	 this	
covariate	was	not	in	the	primary	focus	of	our	analysis	we	can	only	speculate	about	the	reasons.	From	
previous	 VAA	 research	 we	 know	 that	 female	 voters	 are	 more	 insecure	 regarding	 their	 electoral	
choice.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 female	 VAA	 users	 take	 the	 received	 voting	 advice	 more	 seriously	 into	
consideration	 than	 their	 male	 counterparts	 (Fivaz	 and	 Nadig	 2010)	 and	 thus	make	 their	 electoral	
decision	on	a	better	informational	basis.	This	could	also	contribute	to	the	significant	effect	of	gender	
in	our	analysis.	However,	based	on	our	data	we	are	not	in	the	position	to	present	empirical	evidence	
for	this.	
																																								 																				
4	Additionally,	estimating	models	with	robust	standard	errors	(using	John	Fox's	“summaryR.lm”	function)	did	
not	change	the	picture.	
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To	sum	up	the	results,	the	effects	in	the	estimated	models	confirm	to	a	large	extent	the	hypotheses	
and	 expectations,	 particularly	 regarding	 the	 positive	 effect	 of	 VAA	 usage	 on	 political	 congruence	
between	the	electorate	and	the	elected.	
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Table	1:	OLS	regression	models	to	predict	positional	difference	between	voters	and	elected	party	
	 Difference	on	left-right	scale	
(MDS)	
Difference	over	9	policy	issues	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	 	 	 	 	
Gender:	female	 -4.759**	
(1.814)	
-6.453***	
(1.862)	
-9.098	(6.904)	 -20.505**	
(7.040)	
Age	 0.102•	
(0.056)	
0.062	
(0.057)	
0.437	
(0.212)	
0.028	
(0.217)	
Language:	F	 -0.978	
(2.404)	
0.981	
(2.456)	
-16.711•	
(9.150)	
-12.710	
(9.283)	
Language:	I	 0.312	
(2.814)	
1.775	
(2.877)	
7.723	
(10.706)	
11.666	
(10.874)	
Political	interest	 -2.286•	
(1.220)	
-2.601*	
(1.246)	
-17.422***	
(4.642)	
-20.144***	
(4.709)	
Information	source	intensity	 1.320	
(0.814)	
1.298	
(0.836)	
5.184•	
(3.097)	
4.133	
(3.158)	
smartvote	user	 -6.221*	
(2.664)	
-6.520*	
(2.720)	
-18.601•	
(10.137)	
-23.202*	
(10.282)	
District	size	 -0.037	
(0.078)	
-0.052	
(0.080)	
-0.091				(0.298)	 -0.370	
(0.304)	
Left-right	position	(MDS):	left	 -17.663***	
(2.013)	
	 -170.025***	
(7.658)	
	
Left-right	position	(MDS):	right	 -28.579***	
(2.433)	
	 -117.203***	
(9.258)	
	
Left-right	position	(self-placement):	left	 	 -17.620***	
(2.332)	
	 -171.035***	
(8.815)	
Left-right	position	(self-placement):	right	 	 -10.152***	
(2.128)	
	 -15.147•	
(8.042)	
Constant	 65.208***	
(5.765)	
66.411***	
(6.013)	
331.545	***	
(21.936)	
344.406***	
(22.727)	
Observations	 2,064	 2,064	 2,064	 2,064	
Adj.	R²	 0.084	 0.038	 0.221	 0.193	
Note:	The	models	were	estimated	using	the	“lm”	function	in	R.	OLS	coefficients	with	standard	errors	in	brackets.	
Significance	levels:	***	p	<	0.001		**	p	<	0.01		*	p	<	0.05		•	p	<	0.1	
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5.	Conclusions	
Our	 findings	presented	 in	 this	paper	 show	 that	 the	positional	 congruence	between	voters	 and	 the	
elected	 political	 party	 is	 significantly	 smaller	 if	 the	 voter	 previously	 used	 a	 VAA.	 Considering	 the	
tentative	character	of	this	paper,	we	are	fully	aware	that	our	results	are	preliminary.	Nevertheless,	in	
particular	 regarding	 the	 ongoing	 debate	 about	 the	 dramatic	 alienation	 between	 citizens	 and	 their	
political	elites	as	well	as	about	 the	crisis	of	current	 representative	democracies	 (e.g.,	Merkel	2015;	
Schmitter	 2015)	 we	 consider	 the	 finding	 both	 relevant	 and	 instructive	 for	 the	 future	 debate.	 Our	
results	show	that	the	use	of	VAAs	leads	to	a	reduction	in	the	positional	distance	between	citizens	and	
elected	 elites	 and	 thus	 that	 VAAs	 contribute	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 contemporary	 representative	
democracies.	
There	 is,	however,	much	 room	 for	methodological	 improvement.	We	would	 like	 to	emphasise	 two	
aspects:	 First,	we	 abstained	 from	applying	weights	 (e.g.,	weights	 for	 the	 party	 choice)	 to	 the	 data	
used	 in	 our	 regression	models.	 Even	 if	 we	 do	 not	 expect	 substantial	 changes	 (based	 on	 previous	
analysis	of	this	data),	we	will	check	this	point	in	a	next	version	of	the	paper.	Second,	we	should	try	to	
relax	 the	 restriction	 to	 the	 nine	 smartvote	 issues	 included	 in	 the	 Selects	 survey	 and	 thematically	
broaden	 our	 analysis.	 This	 could	 lead	 to	 much	 more	 detailed	 insights	 into	 the	 quality	 of	
representation	of	MPs	regarding	the	issue	preferences	of	their	voters.	In	this	case	we	would	need	to	
include	smartvote	voter	data	which	bears	a	couple	of	known	methodological	challenges	(e.g.,	lack	of	
representativeness	 and	 self-selection	 processes).	 Pianzola	 (2014b)	 has	 shown	 a	 possible	 way	 to	
overcome	these	challenges.	Also	other	methodological	approaches	could	be	applied	(e.g.,	matching	
procedures	based	on	the	nine	identical	questions	in	both	surveys	–	the	smartvote	voter	survey	and	
the	representative	Selects	sample).	
Apart	 from	 these	 methodological	 aspects	 future	 research	 could	 benefit	 from	 an	 enlarged	
perspective.	A	growing	number	of	studies	argues	that	the	contemporary	democracies	have	become	
“unequal”	because	the	responsiveness	of	the	political	elites	does	no	longer	reflect	the	preferences,	
wishes	and	interests	of	voters	from	the	middle	and	especially	low-income	classes.	According	to	these	
studies	 representation	 works	 properly	 for	 the	 rich	 only	 and	 increasingly	 neglects	 low-income	
households	(see	Bartels	2008;	Giger	et	al.	2012;	Gilens	2012;	2015;	for	Switzerland	see	Lloren	et	al.	
2015;	Rosset	2013).	By	including	the	voters’	income	level	into	our	analysis	we	could	test	whether	the	
use	of	VAAs	 leads	to	more	equal	representation	or	–	given	the	 importance	of	political	 interest	and	
knowledge	in	our	analysis	–	aggravate	the	problem.	
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Appendix	1:	Candidates	using	smartvote	in	the	2015	Elections	
Party	 C	 sv-C	
N	 N	 %	
	 	 	 	
CVP	 462	 386	 83.5	
FDP	 467	 448	 95.9	
SVP	 439	 371	 84.5	
SP	 502	 464	 92.4	
GPS	 388	 341	 87.9	
GLP	 363	 330	 90.9	
BDP	 229	 185	 80.8	
	 	 	 	
Total	main	seven	parties	 2,850	 2,525	 88.6	
	 	 	 	
Other	parties	 1,023	 742	 72.5	
	 	 	 	
Total	 3,873	 3,267	 84.4	
	 	 	 	
Source:	smartvote.ch	
Notes:	C	=	candidates;	sv-C	=	candidates	using	smartvote.	
	
Appendix	2:	Voters	and	smartvote	(sv)	users	compared	
	 sv-V	 Non-sv-V	 V	
	 	 	 	
Gender	(%)	 	 	 	
Female	 42.8	 49.4	 48.0	
Male	 57.2	 50.6	 52.0	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
Age	groups	(%)	 	 	 	
18-24	 19.5	 5.8	 8.6	
25-34	 24.0	 8.8	 11.9	
35-44	 20.5	 13.3	 14.8	
45-54	 19.1	 21.6	 21.1	
55-64	 10.2	 20.0	 17.9	
65-74	 5.7	 18.8	 16.1	
75+	 1.0	 11.7	 9.5	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
Educational	level	(%)	 	 	 	
Compulsory	education	 3.6	 6.4	 5.8	
Basic	vocational	training	 0.3	 1.3	 1.1	
Vocational	education	 20.5	 36.6	 33.2	
Diploma	school	 10.9	 9.4	 9.7	
High	school	 8.9	 5.9	 6.6	
Higher	vocational	training	 17.5	 18.8	 18.5	
University	of	applied	science	 16.6	 7.7	 9.5	
University	 21.7	 13.9	 15.5	
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	 sv-V	 Non-sv-V	 V	
	 	 	 	
Language	(%)	 	 	 	
German	 85.4	 74.0	 76.4	
French	 12.9	 21.3	 19.6	
Italian	 1.7	 4.6	 4.0	
	 	 	 	
Interest	in	politics	(%)	 	 	 	
Very	interested	 32.6	 23.4	 25.3	
Rather	interested	 53.3	 59.2	 58.0	
Rather	not	interested	 13.6	 16.1	 15.6	
Not	interested	at	all	 0.4	 1.2	 1.1	
	 	 	 	
Political	knowledge	(%)	 	 	 	
Low	 1.5	 3.0	 2.7	
Rather	low	 8.6	 12.8	 11.9	
Medium	 21.2	 26.0	 25.0	
Rather	high	 38.5	 36.3	 36.8	
High	 30.2	 21.9	 23.7	
	 	 	 	
Party	choice	(%)	 	 	 	
CVP	 10.3	 12.1	 11.7	
FDP	 12.8	 17.1	 16.2	
SVP	 19.2	 31.3	 28.7	
SP	 20.6	 18.4	 18.9	
GPS	 11.3	 6.1	 7.2	
GLP	 11.8	 3.1	 4.9	
BDP	 3.1	 4.3	 4.1	
Other	parties	 11.1	 7.6	 8.4	
	 	 	 	
Left-right	(self-placement)	(%)	 	 	 	
Left	 12.0	 8.5	 9.3	
Centre-left	 24.4	 14.8	 16.8	
Centre	 34.8	 35.4	 35.2	
Centre-right	 22.8	 30.2	 28.7	
Right	 6.0	 11.1	 10.0	
	 	 	 	
Source:	Selects	2015	post-electoral	voter	survey;	applied	weights:	survey	design	weight	and	party	choice	weight.	
Notes:	sv	=	smartvote;	V	=	Voters;	sv-V	=	voters	using	smartvote;	Non-sv-V	=	voters	not	using	smartvote.	
N	=	3,217-3,484.
	Appendix	3:	Party	and	voter	positions	on	policy	dimensions	and	Selects/smartvote	issues	
	 	 CVP	 FDP	 SVP	 SP	 GPS	 GLP	 BDP	
	 	 C	 V	 sv-V	 C	 V	 sv-V	 C	 V	 sv-V	 C	 V	 sv-V	 C	 V	 sv-V	 C	 V	 sv-V	 C	 V	 sv-V	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
MDS	1st	dimension	
(left-right)	
	 19.9	
(43.0)	
13.5	
(50.7)	
-4.0	
(57.1)	
70.8	
(46.6)	
24.2	
(47.9)	
18.0	
(48.4)	
129.2	
(30.7)	
61.5	
(49.3)	
63.7	
(49.3)	
-109.2	
(21.8)	
-47.5	
(47.3)	
-52.2	
(39.6)	
-107.6	
(19.5)	
-63.2	
(43.6)	
-76.6	
(32.7)	
-45.6	
(34.5)	
-35.2	
(40.4)	
-47.0	
(39.8)	
19.9	
(42.6)	
13.1	
(47.9)	
-0.02	
(50.2)	
MDS	2nd	dimension	 	 36.5	(33.4)	
1.1	
(40.4)	
14.9	
(39.9)	
46.0	
(35.2)	
8.2	
(42.2)	
17.7	
(44.7)	
-7.8	
(34.1)	
-26.0	
(40.8)	
-28.5	
(41.4)	
-19.4	
(17.3)	
-2.5	
(38.4)	
9.5	
(40.9)	
-13.0	
(22.9)	
-4.5	
(33.0)	
7.3	
(32.7)	
37.0	
(27.4)	
6.9	
(36.7)	
11.2	
(36.8)	
31.8	
(41.7)	
-7.9	
(41.8)	
13.7	
(39.2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Do	you	support	a	raise	in	
the	retirement	age	for	
both	women	and	men	
(e.g.	to	67)?	
	 49.2	 39.5	 49.7	 90.2	 45.6	 53.1	 65.8	 29.9	 36.4	 6.2	 31.6	 37.7	 18.1	 35.3	 42.9	 89.5	 50.0	 53.7	 64.7	 42.3	 43.1	
Do	you	approve	that	the	
federal	government	
provides	financial	support	
for	child	care	outside	the	
family?	
	 90.6	 56.2	 59.4	 43.5	 56.5	 63.2	 17.6	 34.8	 34.2	 98.9	 80.9	 89.1	 97.7	 81.0	 81.0	 88.5	 70.5	 73.5	 81.8	 42.7	 29.8	
Should	the	naturalisation	
process	for	third-
generation	foreigners	be	
simplified?	
	 78.8	 72.6	 76.3	 58.8	 76.1	 78.1	 15.7	 42.4	 34.4	 99.6	 94.6	 96.8	 99.7	 95.6	 96.2	 95.5	 87.9	 83.9	 64.0	 68.7	 78.9	
Do	you	think	Switzerland	
should	accept	an	
increased	number	of	
refugees	directly	from	
crisis	regions	for	which	
the	United	Nations	High	
Commissioner	for	
Refugees	(UNHCR)	needs	
host	countries?	
	 70.6	 59.4	 67.9	 37.3	 51.1	 43.4	 6.9	 18.7	 17.7	 98.7	 85.6	 87.2	 99.1	 87.8	 90.1	 89.1	 69.2	 71.0	 54.3	 56.3	 86.2	
Should	the	banking	secret	
within	Switzerland	be	
abolished	towards	Swiss	
tax	authorities?	
	 15.9	 42.9	 39.8	 6.9	 32.4	 30.3	 2.4	 27.6	 26.9	 95.1	 72.1	 68.8	 94.1	 77.2	 77.9	 30.8	 66.1	 69.5	 33.9	 53.3	 61.4	
A	popular	initiative	
demands	that	nuclear	 	 31.6	 69.3	 66.9	 16.4	 58.5	 62.4	 7.2	 50.2	 42.0	 98.9	 90.8	 92.9	 99.7	 98.4	 100.0	 93.4	 89.8	 89.0	 56.2	 74.8	 85.0	
		 	 CVP	 FDP	 SVP	 SP	 GPS	 GLP	 BDP	
	 	 C	 V	 sv-V	 C	 V	 sv-V	 C	 V	 sv-V	 C	 V	 sv-V	 C	 V	 sv-V	 C	 V	 sv-V	 C	 V	 sv-V	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
energy	be	completely	
abandoned	by	2029.	Are	
you	in	favour	of	this?	
In	relation	to	the	
redevelopment	of	the	
Gotthard	road	tunnel,	
Parliament	resolved	upon	
the	construction	of	a	
second	tunnel	tube.	Are	
you	in	favour	of	this?	
	 89.5	 78.9	 87.6	 93.1	 82.0	 84.8	 94.1	 79.9	 81.1	 7.3	 52.0	 54.1	 1.5	 26.6	 20.1	 13.9	 49.4	 50.3	 90.3	 79.6	 99.0	
Resolutions	made	by	the	
European	Court	of	Human	
Rights	(ECHR)	are	binding	
for	Switzerland.	Do	you	
think	that	this	is	justified?	
	 88.9	 63.2	 76.6	 72.1	 63.0	 75.3	 6.4	 31.5	 30.0	 98.7	 85.3	 89.1	 98.5	 88.2	 93.7	 94.6	 90.4	 87.5	 84.9	 64.1	 77.9	
Are	you	in	favour	of	an	
increase	or	decrease	of	
social	services	
expenditures?	
	 40.7	 47.6	 50.3	 14.9	 38.6	 32.2	 8.8	 27.8	 25.3	 92.2	 75.1	 76.8	 84.0	 77.1	 83.8	 30.2	 45.7	 42.1	 31.6	 45.5	 63.5	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Source:	smartvote.ch;	Selects	2015	post-electoral	voter	survey;	applied	weights:	survey	design	weight	and	party	choice	weight.	
Notes:	sv	=	smartvote;	C	=	Candidates	(smartvote	2015);	V	=	Voters	/	sv-V	=	voters	using	smartvote(both	Selects	2015);	MDS:	Mean	of	MDS	standard	coordinates	(standard	
deviation	in	brackets);	Policy	issues:	Average	position	/	equals	the	percentage	of	yes-votes	(original	4	answer	options	recoded	to	yes-no	option,	yes=100,	no=0).	
N	(candidates)=	3,282-3,300;	N	(voters)	=	3,126-3,333.
	References	
Anderson,	Joel	and	Thomas	Fossen	(2014).	Voting	Advice	Applications	and	Political	Theory:	
Citizenship,	Participation	and	Representation.	In:	Marschall,	Stefan	and	Diego	Garcia	(eds.).	
Matching	Voters	with	Parties	and	Candidates.	Voting	Advice	Applications	in	Comparative	
Perspective.	Colchester:	ECPR	Press:	217-226.	
Bartels,	Larry	M.	(2008):	Unequal	Democracy.	The	Political	Economy	of	the	New	Gilded	Age.	
Princeton,	Princeton	University	Press.	
Benoit,	Kenneth	and	Michael	Laver	(2006).	Party	Policy	in	Modern	Democracies.	London/New	York:	
Routledge.	
Carey,	John	M.	and	Matthew	Shugart	Soberg	(1995).	Incentives	to	Cultivate	a	Personal	Vote:	A	Rank	
Ordering	of	Electoral	Formulas.	Electoral	Studies,	14(4):	417-439.	
Cox,	Gary	W.	(1990).	Centripetal	and	Centrifugal	Incentives	in	Electoral	Systems.	American	Journal	of	
Political	Science,	34(4):	903-935.	
Cox,	Gary	W.	(1997).	Making	Votes	Count.	Strategic	Coordination	in	the	World's	Electoral	Systems.	
Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press.	
Cox,	Trevor	F.	and	Michael	A.A.	Cox	(2001).	Multidimensional	Scaling.	Boca	Raton,	FL:	Chapman	&	
Hall/CRC	Press.	
Fivaz,	Jan,	Tom	Louwerse	and	Daniel	Schwarz	(2014).	Keeping	Promises:	Voting	Advice	Applications	
and	Political	Representation.	In:	Marschall,	Stefan	and	Diego	Garcia	(eds.).	Matching	Voters	with	
Parties	and	Candidates.	Voting	Advice	Applications	in	Comparative	Perspective.	Colchester:	ECPR	
Press:	197-215.	
Fivaz,	Jan	and	Giorgio	Nadig	(2010).	Impact	of	Voting	Advice	Applications	(VAAs)	on	Voter	Turnout	
and	Their	Potential	Use	for	Civic	Education.	Policy	&	Internet,	4(2):	167-200.	
Fivaz,	Jan	and	Daniel	Schwarz	(2007).	Nailing	the	Pudding	to	the	Wall	-	E-Democracy	as	Catalyst	for	
Transparency	and	Accountability.	Paper	presented	at	the	International	Conference	on	Direct	
Democracy	in	Latin	America,	Buenos	Aires,	14-15	March	2007.	
Fossen,	Thomas	and	Joel	Anderson	(2014).	What’s	the	Point	of	Voting	Advice	Applications?	
Competing	Perspectives	on	Democracy	and	Citizenship.	Electoral	Studies,	36:	244-251.	
Fossen,	Thomas	and	Bert	van	den	Brink	(2015).	Electoral	Dioramas:	On	the	Problem	of	
Representation	in	Voting	Advice	Applications.	Representation,	51(3):	341-358.	
Garzia,	Diego,	Andrea	De	Angelis	and	Joëlle	Pianzola	(2014).	The	Impact	of	Voting	Advice	Applications	
on	Electoral	Participation.	In:	Marschall,	Stefan	and	Diego	Garcia	(eds.).	Matching	Voters	with	
Parties	and	Candidates.	Voting	Advice	Applications	in	Comparative	Perspective.	Colchester:	ECPR	
Press:	105-114.	
	Germann,	Micha	and	Kostas	Geminis	(2014).	Online	Gimmick	or	Participation	Promoting	Tool?	
Smartvote	and	its	Effect	on	Electoral	Turnout.	Paper	presented	at	the	Annual	Convention	of	the	
Swiss	Political	Science	Association,	January	30-31,	2014,	Berne.	
Gemenis,	Kostas	and	Martin	Rosema	(2014).	Voting	Advice	Applications	and	Electoral	Turnout.	
Electoral	Studies,	23:	281.289.	
Gilens,	Martin	(2012).	Affluence	and	Influence:	Economic	Inequality	and	Political	Power	in	America.	
Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.	
Gilens,	Martin	(2015).	Descriptive	Representation,	Money,	and	Political	Inequality	in	the	United	
States.	In:	Swiss	Political	Science	Review,	21(2):	222-228.	
Giger,	Nathalie,	Jan	Rosset	and	Julian	Bernauer	(2012).	The	Poor	Political	Representation	of	the	Poor	
in	a	Comparative	Perspective.	In:	Representation,	48(1):	47-61.	
Hug,	Simon	and	Tobias	Schulz	(2007).	Left-Right	Positions	of	Political	Parties	in	Switzerland.	Party	
Politics,	13(3):	305-330.	
Kiewiet,	D.	Roderick	and	Matthew	D.	McCubbins	(1991).	The	Logic	of	Delegation:	Congressional	
Parties	and	the	Appropriations	Process.	Chicago,	University	of	Chicago	Press.	
Ladner,	Andreas,	Gabriela	Felder	and	Jan	Fivaz	(2010).	More	than	Toys?	A	First	Assessment	of	Voting	
Advice	Applications	in	Switzerland.	In:	Cedroni,	Lorella	and	Diego	Garzia	(eds.).	Voting	Advice	
Applications	in	Europe.	The	State	of	the	Art.	Naples,	Scripta	Web:	91-123.	
Ladner,	Andreas	and	Jan	Fivaz	(2012).	Voting	Advice	Applications.	In:	Kersting,	Norbert	(ed.).	
Electronic	Democracy.	Opladen,	Barbara	Budrichs	Publisher:	177-198.	
Ladner,	Andreas,	Jan	Fivaz	and	Joëlle	Pianzola	(2012).	Voting	Advice	Applications	and	Party	Choice:	
Evidence	from	smartvote	Users	in	Switzerland.	International	Journal	of	Electronic	Governance,	
5(3/4):	367-387.	
Lau,	Richard	R.	and	David	P.	Redlawsk	(2006).	How	Voters	Decide.	Information	Processing	during	
Election	Campaigns.	Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press.	
Lloren,	Anouk,	Jan	Rosset	and	Reto	Wüst	(2015).	Descriptive	and	Substantive	Representation	of	Poor	
Citizens	in	Switzerland.	In:	Swiss	Political	Science	Review,	21(2):	254-260.	
Lupia,	Arthur	(2003).	Delegation	and	its	Perils.	In:	Kaare	Strøm,	Wolfgang	C.	Müller	and	Torbjörn	
Bergman	(eds.):	Delegation	and	Accountability	in	Parliamentary	Democracies.	Oxford,	Oxford	
University	Press:	33-54.	
Lutz,	Georg	(2016).	Eidgenössische	Wahlen	2015.	Wahlteilnahme	und	Wahlentscheid.	Lausanne,	
Selects	–	FORS.	
Marschall,	Stefan	(2014).	Profiling	Users.	In:	Marschall,	Stefan	and	Diego	Garcia	(eds.).	Matching	
Voters	with	Parties	and	Candidates.	Voting	Advice	Applications	in	Comparative	Perspective.	
Colchester:	ECPR	Press:	93-104.	
	Merkel,	Wolfgang	(ed.)	(2015).	Demokratie	und	Krise.	Zum	schwierigen	Verhältnis	von	Theorie	und	
Empirie.	Wiesbaden,	Springer	VS.	
Müller,	Wolfgang	C.	and	Thomas	M.	Meyer	(2010).	Meeting	the	Challenges	of	Representation	and	
Accountability	in	Multi-Party	Governments.	West	European	Politics,	33(5):	1065-1092.	
Pianzola,	Joëlle	(2014a).	Swing	Voting	due	to	smartvote	Use?	Evidence	from	the	2011	Swiss	Federal	
Elections.	Swiss	Political	Science	Review,	20(4):	651-677.	
Pianzola,	Joëlle	(2014b).	Selection	Biases	in	Voting	Advice	Application	Research.	Electoral	Studies,	36:	
272-280.	
Pitkin,	Hanna	F.	(1967).	The	Concept	of	Representation.	Berkeley,	University	of	California	Press.	
Powell,	G.	Bingham	Jr.	(2004).	The	Chain	of	Responsiveness.	Journal	of	Democracy,	15(4):	91-105.	
Rosset,	Jan	(2013).	Are	the	Policy	Preferences	of	Relatively	Poor	Citizens	Under-Represented	in	the	
Swiss	Parliament?	In:	Journal	of	Legislative	Studies,	19(4):	490-504.	
Schädel,	Lisa,	Daniel	Schwarz	and	Andreas	Ladner	(2016).	Promises	and	Lies.	An	Empirical	
Comparison	of	Swiss	MPs’	Pre-	and	Post-Electoral	Positions.	In:	Bühlmann,	Marc	and	Jan	Fivaz	
(eds.):	Political	Representation:	Roles,	Representatives	and	the	Represented.	London/New	York,	
Routledge:	68-84.	
Schmitter,	Philippe	C.	(2015).	Crisis	and	Transition,	But	Not	Decline.	In:	Journal	of	Democracy,	26(1):	
32-44.	
Schwarz,	Daniel,	Lisa	Schädel	and	Andreas	Ladner	(2010).	Pre-Election	Positions	and	Voting	
Behaviour	in	Parliament:	Consistency	among	Swiss	MPs.	Swiss	Political	Science	Review,	16(3):	
533-564.	
Vassil,	Kristjan	(2012).	Voting	Smarter.	The	Impact	of	Voting	Advice	Applications	on	Political	Behavior.	
Florence,	European	University	Institute.	
Walgrave,	Stefaan,	Peter	van	Aelst	and	Michiel	Nuytemans	(2008).	"Do	the	Vote	Test":	The	Electoral	
Effects	of	a	Popular	Vote	Advice	Application	at	the	2004	Belgian	Elections.	Acta	Politca,	43:	50-
70.	
	
All in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and read them immediately.
